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Abstract
In this note, we use the theory of incentives contracting to characterize the
pattern of nancial transfers within the family. Using an altruistic model with one
parent and two children, we nd that the parent may provide a lower gift to the less
well-o child, while bequests are compensatory.
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1 Introduction
Two main theoretical models have been suggested to explain intergenerational transfers
within the family, i.e. altruism and exchange (see Laferrère and Wol, 2004). In order
to dierentiate between these two motives, most empirical studies focus on the relation-
ship between the level of transfers and the recipient's income, which should be negative
under altruism. Recalling that family transfers may be made either as inter vivos gifts or
bequests, some predictions of the exchange motive t with the data, but some ndings
concerning the provision of transfers among siblings are more consistent with altruism.
On the one hand, bequests are often equally divided across the children, especially
for large estates. Wilhelm (1996) observes equal sharing in about two-thirds of the cases
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and bequests are not really correlated with children's incomes (Dunn and Phillips, 1997).
Behrman and Rosenzweig (2004) nd signicant dierences in reports of bequests between
siblings, but this is mainly due to measurement errors. On the other hand, intrahousehold
evidence on inter vivos transfers suggests that the less well-o children receive more money
(McGarry, 1999, McGarry and Schoeni, 1995), but Cox (1987) and Cox and Rank (1992)
reach the opposite conclusion. Another nding is that inter vivos gifts are very often
directed towards high-educated children, even after controlling for permanent income
eects (McGarry, 1999).
As these ndings challenge the validity of existing theories regarding the motives for
family transfers, some papers have proposed alternative explanations to rationalize the
pattern of gifts and bequests. Parents may suer from a psychic cost if they deviate from
equal division of bequests (Wilhelm, 1996). Gifts are likely to be private information
(Lundholm and Ohlsson, 2000), and parents may know the permanent incomes of the
children only with uncertainty (McGarry, 1999). Cremer and Pestieau (1996) develop a
model of transfers in a setting of moral hazard and adverse selection and show that altru-
istic parents use a mix of inter vivos gifts and bequests. The child may be more deprivated
when receiving less than siblings (Stark, 1998), and the division of bequests provides a
signal about parental preferences (Bernheim and Severinov, 2003). Interestingly, these
theoretical explanations predict the use of a mix of gifts and bequests, but the expected
eects are ambiguous concerning their redistributive eects
1
.
In this paper, we draw on the theory of incentives contracting and present an altruistic
model involving the use of a gift-bequest mix. We prove that bequests are compensatory
owing to parental altruism, while the relationship between inter vivos gifts and the recipi-
ent's income may be positive or negative depending on the child's degree of risk aversion.
The remainder of this note is organized as follows. In section 2, we describe the model.
The optimal pattern of transfers is derived in section 3. Section 4 concludes.
2 The model
Let us consider a family with one parent and two children, respectively denoted by up-
scripts p and i = 1, 2. Children are heterogeneous and the type of child is given by ability
wi, where wi is the child's wage rate on the labor market. We assume that w1 > w2,
meaning that child 1 is more able than child 2. There are two periods in the model.
In the rst one, children are young and they choose a level of eort ei, which aects
income expectations. The child will receive more money in the second period with more
1
In Cremer and Pestieau (1996) and Stark (1998), bequests should have a stronger redistributive
impact than gifts and gifts should be the same for all children. Conversely, in McGarry (1999) and
Lundholm and Ohlsson (2000), gifts are more likely to be directed towards the less well-o children.
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eort now. For instance, eort may be seen as time spent on the search for better job
opportunies. However, eort is costly for the children. The parent who behaves in an
altruistically way seeks to compensate the children for disutility involved by eort. Let
mi be the price per unit of eort, so that the gift made by the parent to the child i is
simply eimi. Importantly, we assume that eort is perfectly observable, so that there is
no problem of adverse selection. In the second period, children receive an activity income
which is proportional to previous eort. They also receive a bequest bi from the parent.
The budget constraints are (∀i = 1, 2):
Ci1 = m
iei (1)
Ci2 = w
iei + bi (2)
where Ci1 and C
i
2 are the levels of consumption per period for child i. In period 1, the
problem for the child i is to maximize the utility function vi, whose arguments are Ci1
and ei 2. In the sequel, we assume that both children have identical preferences, so that
v1 = v2 = v. The maximization program is for child i given by:
max
ei
v(Ci1, e
i) (3)
so that the marginal cost of eort is equalized with its marginal benet:
−miv1(miei∗, ei∗) = v2(miei∗, ei∗) (4)
The optimal level of eort ei∗ may be expressed as ei∗ = ei∗(mi). When dierentiating
∂v/∂ei = 0, we nd that ei∗ depends on the child's degree of relative risk aversion σ.
Indeed, we have sgn dei∗/dmi = sgn (v1 + mieiv11 + eiv21). For the sake of simplicity, we
assume separability for v such that v21 = 0. It follows that :
sgn dei∗/dmi = sgn (1− σ)
where the measure of relative risk aversion is σ = −mieiv11(.)/v1(.). Clearly, dei∗/dmi > 0
when σ < 1. Eort is an increasing function of the parental inter vivos transfer only when
the child is characterized by a low risk aversion. Finally, let V (mi) = supei v (m
iei, ei) be
the child's indirect utility, with V ′ = ei∗v1(.) > 0.
The parent proposes an incentives contracting menu that accounts for the children's
well-being. We assume that the parent is motivated by paternalistic altruism. Children
behave in a myopic way and are unable to perfectly foresee the consequences of their
current behavior. Hence, the parent's objective function is given by a weighted sum of
his own (linear) utility Y p − ∑2i=1 (miei∗ + bi) and of the children's well-being given by∑2
i=1 (V (m
i) + u(wiei∗ + bi)), Y p being the parental income. The function u indicates how
2
The utility function vi (i = 1, 2) is supposed to be continuous, twice dierentiable, and concave.
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the parent evaluates the children's actions through his own preferences
3
. The problem for
the parent is:
max
mi,bi
W = Y p −
2∑
i=1
(
miei∗ + bi
)
+ β
2∑
i=1
(
V (mi) + u(wiei∗ + bi)
)
(5)
where β is the degree of parental altruism (with 0 < β < 1). From the two rst-order
conditions ∂W/∂mi = 0 and ∂W/∂bi = 0, we obtain (∀i = 1, 2):
−(ei +miei′) + β(V i′ + wiei′u′) = 0 (6)
−1 + βu′ = 0 (7)
Since u′ = 1/β and using (6), we get −(ei +miei′)+βV ′ +wiei′ = 0. Then, recalling that
V ′ = ei∗v1(.), we nally deduce:
βei∗v1(miei∗, ei∗) + ei
′
(wi −mi∗)− ei∗ = 0 (8)
3 The optimal pattern of transfers
We now characterize the distribution of parental transfers, gifts and bequests. Given
the separability assumption for v, we rely on the following form v(miei) − ψei. Thus,
ψ is simply the cost per unit of eort. Condition (4) is now miv′(miei∗) = ψ (with
v′ = v1), so that we obtain 1 + mie′(mi)/e(mi) = 1/σ after some manipulations. Using
βeiψ/mi + e′(wi −mi)− ei = 0 and mie′/e = (1− σ)/σ, it follows that :
−mi∗ + (wi −mi∗)1− σ
σ
+ βψ = 0 ∀i = 1, 2 (9)
from which we deduce the optimal inter vivos gifts mi. The bequest values bi are then
obtained using u′(wiei∗ + bi∗) = 1/β.
Proposition 1 The optimal pattern of family transfers is given by (∀i = 1, 2):
i) mi∗ = (1− σ)wi + σβψ
ii) bi∗ = u′−1(1/β)− wiei∗(mi∗)
In our framework, the incentive rate mi is a convex combination of wi and βψ, with
weights given by σ and 1−σ. Results from comparative statics imply that ∂mi∗
∂β
= σψ > 0,
∂mi∗
∂ψ
= σβ > 0, ∂m
i∗
∂σ
= −(w − βψ) < 0 (since β < 1 and ψ < wi), and ∂mi∗
∂wi
= (1 − σ).
Let us briey interpret these results. The inter vivos transfer is larger when the parent
3
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is more altruistic and when the cost per unit of eort is high, while it is a decreasing
function of the child's risk aversion. Finally, the gift value may be either increasing or
decreasing with the child's wage rate, depending on the child's measure of relative risk
aversion. With σ < 1, the parent provides more incentives to the child and a richer
child is expected to receive more money. Conversely, when the child is risk averse, less
money is given by the parent, which is usually expected in an altruistic model. Hence,
our incentives contracting model shows that it is important to account for risk attitudes.
Proposition 2 The distribution of gifts and bequests between children is such that:
i) b2∗ > b1∗ ∀0 < σ
ii) m1∗ ><= m
2∗ ⇔ σ <>= 1
So, we nd that child 2 is expected to receive a higher amount of bequests that child
1
4
. Given heterogeneity in wages, our model leads to a compensatory motivation for
bequests. However, results are dierent for inter vivos transfers since the intrafamily
distribution of gifts depend on the children's risk aversion. Despite of parental altruism,
inter vivos transfers are not necessarily directed to the less well-o child. Gifts may be
either compensatory or uncompensatory, depending on the children's degree of relative
risk aversion. With a low risk aversion, the model predicts that the most able child (i.e.
child 1) will receive a larger gift, while child 2 receives a larger bequest. Conversely, when
σ > 1, the less able child receives larger amounts of gift and bequest from the parent.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we have considered an incentives contracting model of family transfers.
An altruistic parent provides inter vivos transfers to compensate the children for disu-
tility involved by observable eort and post mortem bequests to equalize the children's
marginal utilities of consumption. When characterizing the optimal pattern of transfers,
we nd that bequests are compensatory, while the relationship between inter vivos gifts
and children's incomes can be either positive or negative. Thus, accounting for family
incentives may explain why inter vivos transfers are most ofen directed towards more
educated children. Also, our theoretical framework suggests that it would be useful to
introduce the children's risk attitude in empirical analyses of family transfers.
4
Using Proposition 1, we deduce that b2∗ > b1∗ if w2e2(m2) < w1e1(m1), which always holds. The
proof is similar when comparing m1∗ and m2∗.
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